



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
111 SOUTH GEORGE MASON DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VA 22204-1382



NGB-ARC (1-1m)

21 DEC 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (All States Log Number 195-0058) Fiscal Year 1995 Army National Guard (ARNG) Conference Program - Supplemental Actions

1. The FY 95 ARNG Conference Program listing was previously published and distributed to your organization. This memo provides a listing of those events approved subsequent to that list, as well as corrections.
2. Addressees are reminded that approval of the listed events specifically includes frequency, locations and authorized attendees. Deviation from these criteria requires approval by the Deputy Director, ARNG or the Chief of Staff, Army National Guard Readiness Center. Your cooperation and support is essential in helping proponents to meet these conditions. These actions are designed to foster more effective communications while limiting costs in travel funds and time.
3. The FY 95 program represents significant reductions in travel costs and time required for these events. As we continue our efforts to achieve additional savings, we want to ensure that we continue to support those functions that add value to the ARNG. Your continued scrutiny and comments are crucial to that process.
4. The ARNG point of contact for this action is Mr. Dave Phelps, telephone commercial 703-607-7523, DSN 327-7523.

FOR THE CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU:

Encl

MORGAN F. DENNY
Colonel, GS
Director, Army Comptroller

DISTRIBUTION:
CofS (1)
USP&FO (1)

FY 95 ARNG CONFERENCE PROGRAM

PROPONENT

EVENT TITLE/FREQUENCY/LOCATION ATTENDEES

ADDITIONS

NGB-ARC-F

Pay & Exam Supervisor Training; one time, FY 95 only; PEC; maximum 1 attendee per state

NGB-ARC-A

Structure Query Language Training; two courses, FY 95 only; PEC; maximum 1 training seat per state

NGB-OSA

Airlift Coordinator Training; FY 95 only; one class each in Southeast and Northwest U.S locations; maximum training of 30 personnel.

NGB-ARO

POMSO Workshop; FY 95 only; PEC; maximum 3 attendees per state.

REVISION

NGB-ARP

Strength Management Conference; FY 95 only; PEC; attendance by R&R Managers, R&R Sergeants Major, state ESO, maximum of 20 RIO or NCOIC (to be designated by NGB-ARP). Total attendance not to exceed 260.

CORRECTION

NGB-ARP

AGR Manager Workshop; 1 time, FY 95 only; PEC; 2 attendees per state (max workshop 120 pers)

Table of Contents

National Guard Priorities

-by LTG Edward D. Baca, Chief, National Guard Bureau

Stabilizing the Force

-Army National Guard Force Structure

-Retention of Army Guard Divisions

-Air National Guard Force Structure

Full Time Support

-Technician Pay Shortfall (ARNG)

-DoD Directed Cuts

-Sufficient AGR Strength

-Increase in Controlled Grades

Resourcing the Requirement

-Maintaining Readiness of the Army National Guard

-Operations Tempo in the Airlift/Air Refueling World

Priorities for the National Guard

As we celebrate the 358th anniversary of the National Guard, we should take pride in the countless accomplishments of our soldiers and airmen. Today, in 1994, the National Guard is a full participating member in the Total Force of the world's only superpower. Our participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, deployments to Somalia, Bosnia and the Sinai, and other federal missions, plus our superb performance responding to floods, fires hurricanes and other domestic emergencies, are testimony to our dedication and expertise. But, we would be foolish not to recognize the critical challenges that lie ahead.

As the 104th Congress convenes, with a pledge to support a stronger defense, we must also face the fact that money for defense is extremely tight. The days of plenty are behind us, and we have to make every defense dollar count toward readiness.

There is no doubt in my mind that the National Guard is an excellent investment for America. I like to describe the Guard as a whole life insurance policy at term life prices. For every dollar invested in the National Guard, the nation receives a force well trained for the federal mission, but also capable of performing in domestic emergencies. But, being a good investment is not enough. We need to reach a consensus on where the most critical needs are.

The strength of the National Guard has always been that we truly represent grassroots America. It is that grassroots support that spurred the Congress to insure we got what we needed as the military modernized during the 80's. In fact, it is safe to say that our grassroots support is responsible for much of the modernization of our Army and Air Guard. Certainly it is at the heart of our much needed military construction in recent years.

But, with the shortage of defense dollars, we realize that there is no longer the potential for everyone to get every program or piece of equipment they want. In fact, much of the money that appears as an "add-on" in the authorization or appropriations act is, in fact, merely a fence on dollars that

would have been appropriated to us for critical readiness items. This hurts all of us. What we need to do is marshal our resources and concentrate our efforts on those things which will best benefit the total Guard. We need to strive to create a situation of 'haves and have mores' instead of "haves and have nots."

Many of the Adjutants General have asked how they can help. The primary way we can support each other is to speak with one voice, and clearly enunciate critical priorities. To assist in this process, and after discussion with both the Army and Air Director, I have arrived at three principal areas, critical to our continued success, which I feel need our undivided attention and action. During the hearings this winter and spring, we will emphasize the urgency of these areas.

A: Stabilizing the Force Structure

Since the late 80's the entire Department of Defense has been involved in massive downsizing. While much of this is a necessary response to the end of the Cold War, it has nonetheless created a great deal of turmoil in our force.

One bright spot has been the Off-Site Agreement between the Army, Army Reserve, key associations, and the National Guard. This agreement gives the Army National Guard a "road map" for future force structure actions. The Off-Site Agreement is not a panacea that absolved us from the pain of drawdown. It involves painful cuts. However, we have worked hard to minimize the impact and "spread the hurt" as much as possible. It is vital that we preserve the Off-Site Agreement, because I am convinced that the alternative would be much worse. If the agreement comes apart, we would inevitably find ourselves in continuing battles with the other components that would drain our resources, our energy, and our talent that could better be used to further the goals of national defense.

We need to remain steadfast in our resolve to retain our divisions. These divisions have an imbedded capability critical to our performance of our domestic mission. To ensure the future of the divisions, we must strive for relevant wartime missions for these units.

On the Air Guard side, we must hold the line on further cuts. So far, we have been able to drawdown without closing flying units by reducing the number of aircraft assigned. We are painfully close to the line where it is no longer cost effective to follow this path. Further cuts will result in units closing.

Congressional adjustments to the budget do not always supply what the National Guard needs most. Congressional "add-backs" often lack total required funding. We get the force structure but end up having to take the dollars to support it out of our existing limited resources, or the "add-back" applies to only one year. These incomplete fixes do not help us, in the long run. When considering our force structure needs we must also take into account the associated effects on pay, full-time support, and O&M tail.

B: Full Time Support

Another critical priority is full time support. Over the years, we have seen an erosion in this area, to the point where the Army National Guard is only funded for 60 percent of its full time requirements. This problem is magnified as we attempt to manage tiered readiness. With the requirement for greater full time support in early deploying units, the percentage for later deploying units will fall further below acceptable levels.

Both the Army and Air National Guard are facing a crisis with planned military technician cuts. A 20 percent OSD directed technician cut will directly impact the readiness of all our units, cutting into the heart of our maintenance force. The results will be no less than devastating.

Language in the FY 95 Appropriations Act exempted the National Guard from arbitrary cuts this year, but we expect the Department of Defense to proceed with planned cuts for FY 96 through FY 01. We must make sure everyone understands the severity of these planned cuts for the entire National Guard. If these cuts occur, not only will jobs be lost, but we will face a serious challenge to our ability to perform both our national defense and domestic mission.

C: Funding Equal to the Requirement

We must secure adequate funding to do all the things we are required to do as a vital partner in the Total Force. This means insuring we have enough O&M dollars to convert into training, readiness and operational capability.

O&M funding becomes especially critical in light of increased operations tempo. The Air National Guard has been supporting real world contingencies at a record rate, and will continue to do so. The Army Guard's recent participation in MFO Sinai and mobilization in support of Restore Democracy demonstrate increased reliance on the Guard in peacetime operations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense is proposing that real world missions can be substituted for annual training in some instances. All of these indicators point to an increased operations tempo, which in turn dictates funding essential O&M dollars.

For the past several years we have been fortunate in the area of equipment modernization. But, with modern equipment came more training, maintenance, and minor construction requirements. We have continued to fund tank miles and flying hours at adequate levels, but we are doing it at the expense of infrastructure and soldier support. For example, in FY 95, the organizational clothing and equipment account was severely reduced to fund op tempo. Now is the time to focus on prioritizing funding equal to our requirements so that we do not continue to mortgage our future.

Summary

All three priority areas, stabilized force structure, full-time support, and operations and maintenance funding, require defense dollars which are increasingly scarce. Additionally, other service components have requirements, equally important to them, which compete for these scarce defense dollars. This is why I believe it is so critical that we concentrate primarily on these three areas which are the lifeblood of our force.

The National Guard has an advantage in the process in that we truly represent the best investment for the taxpayer. We need to assure that story is understood. Attached are point papers which give greater details on some

of these areas, from our perspective. As Adjutants General, you know best the enormous return the nation enjoys in terms of our domestic and community role. If we focus our energy on the critical areas, and speak consistently with one voice, I have no doubt we can be successful.

Priority: Stabilize the Force structure

Issue: Force structure in the Army National Guard

Discussion:

- Maintain Force Structure and End Strength Allowance as agreed to in Off Site Agreement

-- The end strength goal of this provision is to have an active Army of 500,000, Guard end strength of 367,000 within 405,000 force structure allowance, and an Army Reserve force of 208,000.

-- This 1.1 million soldier Army is the minimum size force needed to accomplish missions in the beginning of the next century.

-- The CSA accepted all provisions of the off-site and approved their inclusion into the Army POM.

- We must maintain the "right" force structure

-- The Army National Guard must be capable and available when called upon by the National Command Authority or the governors of the states and territories.

-- In order to maintain their diversified capability, the ARNG must have a balanced force of combat, combat support and combat service support units.

-- The CSA recognized the requirement for this balance and has approved an Army National Guard combat force of 42 brigades. This force will consist of eight divisions. 15 enhanced brigades and three strategic reserve brigades.

Solution: Maintain balanced force structure, to include eight divisions, 15 Enhanced Brigades and 3 strategic reserve brigades; and an end strength of 367,000 with a force structure allowance of 405,000.

Priority: Stabilizing the Force Structure

Issue: Retention of Army National Guard Divisions

Discussion:

National Guard Divisions must be retained in the force structure

-Chief of Staff of the Army has recognized them as part of the Army Baseline Combat Force

-They provide the strategic hedge for two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies

-Divisions represent 120,000 spaces, or 30% of Army National Guard force structure

-They have imbedded capabilities critical to the performance of the domestic mission

--Medical, aviation, engineer, transportation, maintenance, and command and control capabilities of the divisions are essential when responding to natural disaster or civil disturbance

Solution: National Guard Divisions play a vital role in both the federal and domestic missions and must be retained in the Army National Guard.

Priority: Stabilize the Force Structure

Issue: Force Structure in the Air National Guard

Discussion: Force structure should be maintained or increased in flying and non-flying units and missions in the Air National Guard.

- Budget pressures have forced the ANG to go to the minimum economical flying unit size in almost all weapon systems to preserve flags and community presence.

- To date, no unit closures have been required, but any additional cuts in primary aircraft assigned (PAA) would require units closures to avoid high cost (per PAA) operations and reduced combat capability.

- Additional force structure directed to the ANG would be used to robust existing units and regain efficiencies. It would also increase combat and contingency capability.

- PAA increases that do not come at active duty expense are costly; F-15s or F-16s required modernization for safety and mission effectiveness.

- Some processes do not work smoothly

- Congressional "add backs" to force structure are often only temporary and lack all required end strength, base operation support costs, and full time manning.

Solution: Putting fully resourced force structure into the Air National Guard provides military capability at reduced cost and makes sense in an environment of fiscal austerity.

Priority: Full-time Support

Issue: FY95 Shortfall in Military Technician Pay

Discussion:

The Army National Guard is suffering from a serious shortfall in dollars to pay military technicians

-Shortfall has resulted in elimination of approximately 1900 technician positions across the nation

-States have been notified of cuts

Shortfall was exacerbated by Appropriations Conference cutting \$32 million from budget request

-reason given was "civilian understrength"

-historically, DoD funded technicians at 98% of authorized levels, then further decremented the ARNG for not achieving 100% manning

-this negative spiral is now threatening our readiness posture

In addition to elimination of technician positions, there is also a shortfall in "buy-out" money:

-States are requesting amount needed and ARP is divying up funds

-no state has received more than 60% of funds requested for buy-outs

Solution: Restoration of \$32 million to the FY95 technician pay account

Priority: Full-time Support

Issue: DoD Directed Technician Cuts for the Army and Air National Guard

Discussion: OSD directed arbitrary cuts in military technician workforce as part of across the board reduction of the federal civilian workforce.

-Cuts were to be taken from FY95 through FY 01

-Language in the Appropriations Bill prohibited National Guard technician cuts that were *not tied to force structure reductions*

-Prohibition only in effect for FY 95, and funding levels were not restored with prohibition

OSD is planning to pursue the across the board cuts of technicians in FY 96 through FY01

-Reduction would equal 5,251 on the Air side

-Reduction would equal 5,500 on the Army side

Cuts of this size would be devastating to the National Guard

-Military technicians are readiness "multipliers"

-On the Army side, cuts would directly impact readiness programs, specifically maintenance of combat equipment

-Cuts on the Air side would cripple maintenance in flying units

--all units would be at C-3 by FY 98 and C-4 by FY99-00

-24 ANG units would have to close to maintain 2 MRC capability

Solution: To avoid serious readiness impacts, technician force levels should be re-established and funded to FY 94 levels

Priority: Full Time Support

Issue: Maintaining AGR Strength in the ARNG

Discussion:

Maintaining the proper level of AGR positions is a critical issue facing the Army National Guard today

-Projected loss of 2,170 authorizations from FY94 to FY99, with a total reduction from FY91 of 4,189

-The FY94 authorization of 24,180 reflects a 59.9% level of support versus requirements

-This is well below the objective support level of 80% recommended in The Army Plan (TAP)

-Reductions programmed through FY99 place unit readiness in serious jeopardy

ARNG must receive additional AGR authorizations to support new missions and requirements

-For example, ROTC, Bridging Concept, and ORE teams all carry additional full-time support requirements

-As new missions are resourced from existing authorizations, required full time support in units falls even further below acceptable levels

Solution: AGR authorizations should be kept at the FY94 level of 24,180 and there should be no further reductions. New missions must come with appropriate AGR authorizations. Full time support levels should move toward 80% recommended by Army.

Priority: Full Time Support

Issue: Controlled Grade Relief

Discussion:

Controlled grade relief is required to allow management flexibility and mobility of career AGR officers and soldiers

-An increase in requirements, lack of additional authorizations, and relative newness of the program have combined to preclude a balance between attrition and upward mobility

-Promotions for officers and soldiers have been delayed based on insufficient number of controlled grades

-Small incremental increase in controlled grades does not impact the overall Army National Guard end strength

-An increase in controlled grades will provide flexibility for managers and career opportunities for the "maturing" AGR force

Solution: Slight increases in controlled grades, i.e. a plus-up of 19 for O-6, 24 for O-5, and 16 each for E-9 and E-8.

Priority: Resourcing the Requirement

Issue: Maintaining Readiness of the ARNG during Austere Budget Periods

Discussion:

Schools- Funding for schools is on the decline and will reach "emergency" proportions in the outyears. Optimally, the school requirement should be about \$500 per soldier. This amount has steadily declined and will be at \$380 per soldier by FY97.

Special Training - Both new and modernized equipment and expanded missions have and will continue to increase the requirements in this program.

The special training funding needs to be \$195 per soldier. This funding has steadily declined and will be at \$42 per soldier FY97.

ARNG Modernization -The ARNG of the future will comprise 59 percent of the combat units of the Total Army.

In the process of growth, 43 armor battalions/squadrons will be upgraded to M1 tanks, 34 battalions will upgrade to Bradley Fighting Vehicles, eight Howitzer battalions will be upgraded to MLRs and a Patriot battalion will be added to the force.

These upgrades bring with them training bills, higher optempo costs and increased maintenance requirements.

Operations Tempo - The cost per mile for the 367,000 modernized ARNG requires about a 50 percent increase in optempo dollars over that required to support the same level of readiness (288 miles) of the 440K ARNG.

AC to RC Support - Beginning in FY95, the AC will begin the GFRE in an attempt to provide 3,000 additional AC advisors to support the combat, combat support and combat service support of the ARNG and USAR.

The apportioned "share" for paying for the travel, supplies, equipment and operation of these teams is \$36.4 million in FY96. This bill has not been funded.

Enhanced Brigades - "Enhancements" include authorized over-structure, priority for resources, increased AC to RC training support, increased training opportunities and command and control capability. They are planned for a final fielding by FY99. Fully funding the Enhanced Brigades has exacerbated the schools and special training funding problem.

Solution: Full funding will alleviate serious shortfalls in schools and special Training, modernization and associated optempo, and the Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement Program.

Priority: Funding Equal to the Requirement

Issue: Operational Tempo in the Airlift/Air Refueling World

Discussion: Current airlift and air refueling requirements on a continuous basis, consistently outstrip the availability of the resources. All operations since Desert Storm have included those two categories of missions. In operations for humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster relief or war fighting. Global Reach/Power are greatly projected by the ability to airlift the necessary forces non-stop (by means of air refueling) and to be able to keep those forces resupplied.

ANG airlift and air refueling assets have provided support to all contingency operations since Desert Storm and will be called upon to support any or all future contingencies due to the force structure changes that have occurred over the past two years.

- ANG strategic and tactical airlift have supported the following contingency operations in the past two years: Restore Hope, Restore Hope II, Support Hope, Provide Comfort, Provide Comfort II, Provide Promise, Southern Watch and Uphold Democracy.

- ANG air refueling assets have provided assistance in the following contingency operations: Restore Hope, Support Hope, Southern Watch (Phoenix Jackal), Deny Flight and Uphold Democracy.

- Daily operational taskings also have required extensive use of ANG resources.

- Strategic airlift provides over 45 percent of their flying time to HQ AMC.

- Tactical airlift (C-130s) have provided three to four aircraft and 45 to 55 personnel on a continuous rotation to Panama for Coronet Oak.

- KC-135 tankers provide 24-hour, 365 days a year alert response to the defense of Iceland with one aircraft and 10 personnel. They also provide air refueling

assistance to the NATO AWACS component based in Germany for 40 weeks each year with two aircraft and 28 personnel.

- 53 percent of CONUS tanker alert is provided by the ANG.

- ANG tankers located in the northeast CONUS provided daily assistance for high priority refuelings for special airlift missions or the movement of fighter aircraft over the North Atlantic. All ANG tanker units provide weekly assistance to HQ AMC for air refueling training requirements of AETC schoolhouses and AFOTEC (testing Centers). 42 percent of all CONUS air refueling training support is provided by the ANG.

- 37,000 MPA workdays from AMC were used by ANG tankers in FY94.

- Force structure changes that have occurred that add more of the heavy aircraft into the ANG fleet have put additional emphasis on the need for ANG participation in all activities that the Air Force conducts.

Conclusion: Resource drawdowns, both manpower and dollar, forecast in the out years, combined with the ever increasing demand for increased ANG participation and "ops tempo", will force the ANG to decline participation in some future operations, or risk being spread dangerously thin.

Solution: With increased crew ratio, including associated flying hours, manning, O&M dollars, etc, the increased participation and increased "ops tempo" can be accomplished with proper management.